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Prohibiting Restriction of Free Trade
within the Community: Articles 30-36 of
the EEC Treaty*
P. VerLoren van Themaat**
L. W. Gormley***

Theproblem of accommodatingthe tensions ofpower between the European Economic Community and individualMember States isparticularly

acute in the area ofprohibitionson restrictionoffree trade within the Community. Professor van Themaat and Mr. Gormley analyze key aspects of
thisproblem in select decisions of the Court of Justice concerningArticles
30-36 of the EEC Treaty. The areas of discussion include the extent to
which Articles 30-36 affect internaleconomic regulationsofMember States,
the difference between trading within an established Community organization andtrade in an area where no organization exists, and the relation of
Articles 30-36 to otherprovisionsof the Treaty. The authorsconclude with a

considerationof theprospectsforfederalizationwithin the Common Market
in light of the cases discussed earlier.
* This article is the result of a common effort of both authors, sitting at their academic desks
in Utrecht and Liverpool in the years 1979 and 1980. It, therefore, covers the case law up to and
including 1980. For cases decided in 1981, see note 162 infra. A few months afterwards the
governments of the Member States appointed Professor van Themaat an Advocate General at the
Court ofJustice of the European Communities. He, therefore, must leave open the possibility that
after having listened to arguments of parties before the Court he will change opinions as expressed
in this article. With this caveat, Professor van Themaat nevertheless accepts the full responsibility
for the final text of this article, and has relied upon the editors for the final documentation.
** Professor of Economic Law, University of Utrecht (The Netherlands).
Barrister, Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool (England).
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INTRODUCTION

The Place of Articles 30-36 in the System of the EEC Treaty
Articles 30-36 of the EEC Treaty are central to the structure of the
Community. They illustrate the division of competence between the
European Economic Community and the Member States.' The farreaching influence of these Articles has become particularly apparent
since the leading case of Dassonville.2 Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter the Court of Justice)
have covered such diverse fields of law as patents and trademarks, price
regulations, food and drug legislation, unfair competition legislation,
pharmaceutical legislation and other more general areas of public
health control. The judgments also covered law concerning public morality, taxation, the environment, agriculture and fishing. This catalog,
based on the existing case law, is by no means an exhaustive list of the
areas of national law that potentially may be affected by these Articles.
Under the well-known basic formula set forth in Dassonville, a national law is incompatible with Articles 30-36 if it falls into the category
of "trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade."3 Such an incompatible national law is a forbidden measure
having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports or
exports. The concept of a "trading rule," according to case law, must
be interpreted broadly enough to encompass even those measures that
only indirectly or potentially affect trade in goods. 4 Thus the effect of
the relevant measure, and not its aim, is important. The interpretation
of the "trading rule" concept creates certain fringe difficulties. Prior to
examining these fringe difficulties and Articles 30-36 in detail, it is desirable to make several general observations about the role of Articles
30-36 relative to other Articles within the EEC Treaty system.
Article 2 of the Treaty5 lists the general tasks of the Community
as: promoting a harmonious development of economic activities
I The significance of the development of case law on this part of the Treaty in assessing the
more or less "federative" character of the European Communities has been discussed in detail in
the recent reports on this subject by Van Empel and Slot for the Dutch Association for European
Law in Tifdschri voor Europees en Economisch Recht, [1980] SociAAL-EcoNoMISCHE WETGEVING [S.E.W.] 244.
2 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 436.
3 Id. at 852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 453-54.
4 Id. at 852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 436.
5 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
15 (enteredin force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
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throughout the Community, promoting a continuous, balanced expansion and increase in economic stability, achieving an upward acceleration of the standard of living and developing closer relations between
the Member States. Article 2, however, is not merely a list of tasks; it
also indicates the Community's two main intermediate objectives that
must be attained to accomplish these general tasks: first, the establishment of a common market and second, the progressive approximation
of the economic policies of Member States. More simply stated, Article
2 reveals a fundamental polarity in the structure of the EEC Treaty
between trust in market forces on one hand, and on the other hand,
reliance on regulation and planning through government intervention
to correct imbalances of market forces. This polarity is commonly
the economic structure
found in various forms in the policies governing
6
of the Member States of the Community.
Significantly, the EEC Treaty does not specify a priori-anymore
than does any national constitution of the Member States-where the
precise balance between the two poles of "market forces" and "government intervention" must lie. Instead, the choice of the desired economic order, in practice, is left to the outcome of discussions essentially
political in nature. Because of the political nature of this balance, it is
gratifying that the European Communities have had a directly-elected
Parliament at their disposal since 1979.1 The Parliament offers a better
forum for discussing and deciding questions concerning the most desirable economic order than do the hundreds of meetings of Community
and national technocrats presently used. Even the politically answerable ministers have more than a marginal influence in only a relatively
small number of cases. Although the eventual balance between "market forces" and "government intervention" depends on the policy
choices of the relevant institutions, some important guidelines representing aspects of both poles are contained in the general specifications
of Article 3 of the Treaty.
The most important elements necessary to achieve the first intermediate objective, the establishment of a common market, are (1) the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, (2) the introduction of a system that protects competition in the common market from
distortion, and (3) in the view of some legal writers, the approximation
6 See, e.g., the Seven National Reports on the economic laws of the Member States in the
EEC Studies series on competition and harmonization of laws No. 20, Brussels 1973-77 and the
concluding report for Belgium. See also VAN GERVEN, LEERBOEK HANDELS-EN ECONOMISCH
RmCiT (1978-79).
7 Council Decision 76/787, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 278) 1 (1976).
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of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the proper
functioning of the common market.' According to other legal writers,
however, the approximation of laws also can be used to support corrections of market forces in pursuance of the second intermediate objective: the progressive approximation of the economic policies of the
Member States. Considering the rather neutral wording of Article 100
it seems improbable that this difference of opinion can be resolved
other than through political discussions. Since the text of the Treaty is
broad enough to justify either interpretation of the approximation of
law process, the Court of Justice will not opt quickly to choose one
view over the other.
As mentioned above, the Treaty does not clearly choose which economic system is the most desirable. Yet it is certain that the free
movement of goods, among other things, must be achieved within the
whole territory of the Community. This free movement of goods is to
be realized through the Treaty provisions that abolish customs duties
and charges having an equivalent effect,9 through the vehicle of Arti-

cles 30-36, and through the competition provisions contained in Articles 85 and 86. Although it is not examined in this writing, the Article
37 restrictions on state trading monopolies are also relevant to the free
movement element. In addition, Article 3 indicates the principal forms
that the progressive approximation of the economic policies of the
Member States can take. These forms are first, a common Community
policy (specified further with respect to external trade policy, agriculture and transport),10 second, "the application of procedures 1 ' by which
the economic policies of Member States can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied,"' 2 and third, Community financial support measures (the European Social Fund and the
European Investment Bank are specifically mentioned in Article 3,
3
while Community Decisions have added others).'
Given Article 38 on agriculture, Articles 61 and 74, and the case
law of the Court of Justice on transport, it appears that even a Community policy must respect the intermediate objective for a common mar8 See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at arts. 100-02.
9 Id. at arts. 12-17.
10 Id. at art. 3(d), (e).
11 The term "procedures" is somewhat confusing. Based on Article 103 of the Treaty (conjunctural policy), among others, it seems that the Community can also lay down compulsory
measures of community law in this area. Therefore, the concept of coordination procedures must
be understood in a wide sense, such that it includes the contents of all instruments of Community
law.
12 EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 3(g).
13 Id. at art. 3(i), (0).
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ket with free movement of goods and services, and undistorted and
effective competition. It must be assumed that the same respect for the
common market objective applies to the approximation of laws and the
coordination of national economic policies. This point is significant for
the purposes of this article because it must, for example, lead to the
conclusion that the common agricultural policy, the approximation of
laws, and the conjunctural policies of the Community alike may not
erode the prohibitions imposed by Articles 30-36 of the Treaty.
The Commission in its Twelfth General Report14 expressed the
opinion, based on cases 80-81/77,15 that the above view of the common
market objective also has been adopted by the Court of Justice. If this
conclusion is correct, then it would add important weight to the view
that the Communities are already exhibiting features similar to those of
federalist state systems. Certainly both non-centralized single states
and federal states differ from loose groups of states, since the former
two seek free movement of goods throughout their territory. As Slot
has shown, 16 the Communities have gone further in this respect than
has the United States of America. This assessment is also true of States
with various degrees of economic planning. Therefore, the principle of
the free movement of goods seems to be compatible with all systems of
integration, whether "liberal" or not. Thus, socialists and other interventionists need not oppose the free movement of goods. Rather, they
should basically seek further development of community policies and
greater coordination of national intervention policies in the directions
indicated by the Treaty. In this regard Articles 30-36 indicate that
problems always have to be solved at a level where the causes of existing ills can be effectively countered; to solve these problems the national level is far too low. The Community level, however, offers at
least a better chance of success.
FurtherCharacteristicsofArticles 30-36
Article 3, expanded in this respect by Articles 9-37 of the EEC
Treaty, requires the "free" movement of goods. What exactly is meant
by this concept of "freedom" must be established. In examining this
concept, it is unnecessary to deal in detail with those varying views
advanced by the Commission and by academic writings prior to 1974.17
14 TwELFrH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITIEs 283
(Brussels, Luxembourg 1979).
15 Soci6t6 Les Commissionnaires R6unis, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 927.
16 See note 1 supra.
17 The most important of these views is discussed by Ehlermann in KOMMENTAR ZUM
E.W.G.-VETRAG 253-92 (2d ed. Von der Groeben, von Boeckh & Thiesing eds. 1974).
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At that time it was still generally held that Articles 30-36 concerned
only restrictions on imports and exports caused by State measures. As
will soon become apparent even that view is no longer-clearly accepted.
Moreover, it was agreed that measures that restricted either only imports or only exports were included under the relevant prohibitions in
every case. The only significant difference of opinion concerned the
attitude toward measures that restricted the domestic market as well as
imports or exports. The broad view, first propounded by VerLoren van
Themaat,"8 and later by Waelbroeck,1 9 proclaimed that, in principle,
these measures restricting the domestic market as well as imports or
exports, also fell under the prohibition of Articles 30-36. The narrow
view, on the other hand, represented by Graf,2 0 and slightly less extremely by Meier,2" asserted that the only measures caught by the prohibition were those that restricted imports or exports and discriminated
against them by placing them at a disadvantage as compared with domestic products.
In Directive 70/50/EEC,2 2 the Commission adopted a stance
somewhere in between the broad and narrow views. It decided that
measures equally applicable to both domestic and imported goods
would fall under the prohibition only if their restrictive effect on the
free movement of goods between Member States exceeded their effects
intrinsic to trade rules. In other words, a criterion of proportionality
was created. Article 2 of Directive 70/50/EEC explained that this inclusion under the prohibition occurred especially when the restrictive
effect on trade was disproportionate in relation to the aim of the relevant measure, or if that aim also could be achieved in a way that would
be less restrictive on trade. Since Article 34 of the Treaty, dealing with
restrictions on exports and measures having an equivalent effect, was
not dealt with in the Commission's Directive (which was based on Article 33), the Directive does not contain a more precise definition of
either quantitative restrictions on exports, or of measures having that
equivalent effect. This midway view of the Commission was attacked
by academicians from both sides. Another midway position somewhat
18 Bevat Artikel 30 van hel EE G. Verdragslechts een non-discrimrinatiebeginselten aanzien van
invoerbeperkingen?, 1967 S.E.W. 632.
19 Megret, et al., I LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENE 102 (1970).
20 GRAF,

DER

BEGRIFF

MASSNAHMEN

GLEICHER WIRKUNG

WIE MENGENMASSlGE

EINFUHRBESCHRANKUGEN IN DEM E.W.G.-VERTRAG (1972).

21 See Ehle-Meier, E. W.G.- Warenverkehr, 1971 RDNR. B. 103.
22 Commission Directive 70/50 of Dec. 22, 1969 O.J. EUR. COMM. 17 (Spec. Ed. 1970(1)).
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different from the Commission's was advocated by Ulmer, 3 but that
position generally, is not now discussed.2 4 It, like the other views, was
quickly overtaken by the case law of the Court of Justice.
It is still useful, however, to examine the Commission's Directive
for definitions of national measures that in the Commission's opinion
are always forbidden. For this same purpose, the Court of Justice also
often refers to the Directive. In addition, the principle of proportionality used by the Commission plays a large role in the case law of the
Court of Justice, although it is developed differently. The Court of Justice, however, does not seem to share the Commission's basic view that
equally applicable measures do not, in principle, fall under the prohibition of'Article 30; nonetheless, the Court of Justice is indeed arriving at
a gradually clearer midway point in the controversy over the interpretation of Article 30. This midway point differs as much from the Commission's view as from all the views put forward by the academicians
prior to 1974. As far as Article 34 is concerned, the case law of the
Court to date leaves somewhat more room for uncertainty. The views
expressed in this article on this area of the law, therefore, will be unavoidably less assertive.
The Aims of This Article
Because the Court of Justice does not regard itself as being bound
by the Commission's transitional Directive, 2 5 this article will not deal
with the Directive as such. 26 The Directive, however, will be indirectly
examined to the extent that the case law of the Court of Justice agrees
with it. This article, therefore, deals principally with the case law of the
Court of Justice. Since a complete study of the sixty or so judgments
concerning Articles 30-36 would require a book,27 a certain degree of
selectivity here is unavoidable. Although the Dassonville case 28 gave
everyone, including the Commission, the impression that it applied to
23 Ulmer, Zum Verbot MittelbarerEinfuhib Eschrdinkungen in Enga-Verrag, AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS [A.W.D.] 349.

24 E.g., it is not discussed in Ehlermann's treatment of the subject. See note 17 supra.
25 Directive 70/50, note 22 supra.
26 For a detailed treatment of the most important Directives, see van Themaat's discussion in

[1970] S.E.W. 258.
27 For a detailed discussion of the cases up to July, 1979, see Gormley, Articles 30-36 of the
E.E. Treaty: the cases and some problems with special reference to their relationship with the
Articles ofthe Treaty concerningcompetition (a dissertation for the Middle Temple, London, written under the supervision of Verloren van Themaat, Aug., 1979).
28 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 437.
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Article 34 as well as Article 30, it is now clear from the Groenveld case2 9
that it does not. Thus, Dassonville will be reexamined. After an overview of the main points of the case law relating to Article 30 in Part 2
of this article, Part 3 will deal with the cases concerning Article 34. In
Part 4 the case law on Article 36 will be examined, and Part 5 will
address the question of whether the Member States alone or the Member States together with the Community, are the addressees of Articles
30-36. Part 6 deals with the relationship of Articles 30-36 with other
parts of the Treaty, while in Part 7 a summary and evaluation of the
most important conclusions can be found.
II.

THE CASE LAW ON ARTICLE

30

The Basic Princilein Dassonville and the Rule of Reason
Although there were some cases prior to Dassonville, it was only
with this judgment that the case law on Article 30 came to life. Since
the most important elements of the subsequent case law were set forth
in Dassonville, examination of the case law will begin from there. As
mentioned above, Dassonville set forth the basic principle that "all
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
Dassonville involved scotch whisky
quantitative restrictions."3
purchased in France and imported into Belgium without an accompanying British customs certificate of origin as required by Belgian Law.
The basic principle in the judgment, however, was clearly not restricted
to the facts of the case. It seemed to apply equally to quantitative restrictions on exports and measures having that equivalent effect. But as
was mentioned above, since the judgment in Groenveld this view is no
longer tenable in all circumstances.
It is intended below to return to the general application of the
principle in Dassonville. At this stage, however, it should be noted that
the Court of Justice-differing here from the Commission-made no
exception in principle for measures equally applicable to both domestic
and imported goods. To this extent at least, it seems that the Court
followed the wider interpretation, propounded by Waelbroeck and
VerLoren van Themaat, of the concept of measures of equivalent effect
29 P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap Voor Vee en Viees, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3409,
[1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 207.
30 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. at 453-54.
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to quantitative restrictions.3 1
In Dassonville,however, the Court of Justice went on to qualify its
statement of a basic principle adding a newly formulated exception:
In the absence of a community system guaranteeing for consumers the
authenticity of a product's designation of origin, if a Member State takes
measures to prevent unfair practices in this connection, it is, however,
subject to the condition that these measures should be reasonable and that
the means of proof required should not act as a hinderance to trade between Member States and should, in consequence, be accessible to all
Community nationals.32
This rule of reason, nevertheless, was limited by the assertion that
"whether or not such measures are covered by Article 36, they must
not, in any case, by virtue of the principle expressed in the second sentence of that Article, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between Member States."3 3 The Court of
Justice, in later cases, 34 added a principle of proportionality. This principle provided that reasonable measures resulting in trade barriers,
could be no broader than needed to accomplish the reasonable purpose
for which the measures were introduced.
Certain observations can be made about this rule of reason. First,
this rule of reason is applicable only when the reasonable aim pursued
by the national measure, is not governed by a Community measure.
This restriction is explicable when it is remembered that where a Community measure exists, the relevant national measure is tested, on the
one hand, against the basic principle in Dassonville and, on the other,
against the Community measure. This assertion is based first on the de
Peipfer case,3 5 where the Court of Justice asserted that harmonizing
Directives based on Article 100 of the Treaty did not, and could not,
intend to relieve the Member States of their rather important residual
competence in the field of public health left to them by Article 36.
However, where harmonizing Directives have been adopted in the
technical and administrative fields, as well as with respect to other obstacles to trade, and where Community rules have been provided, the
Court of Justice has held that recourse to the provisions of Article 36 is
no longer justified. The Court of Justice further held that the appropri31 See notes 18-19 supra.
32 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. at 454.
33 Id., [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 454.
34 See, ag., Officier van Justitie v. Adriaan de Peijper, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 613, [1976]
2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 271; Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffr Branntwein, [1979]
E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
35 See note 24 supra.
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ate controls or protective measures must conform to the scheme set
forth in the Community Directive concerned.3 6 Nevertheless, harmo-

nizing directives do not and cannot aim at extending the very considerable powers left to Member States in the field of public health by
Article 36. This confirms that the restriction in the rule of reason in
Dassonville, that applies only when no community measure exists, can
only mean that where a Community measure does exist, the general
principle applies once more and any further requirements of Community law must be respected. Further support for this assertion can be
found in the wide-ranging case law of the Court of Justice concerning
Article 30, and the common organization of the market in certain
argricultural sectors and the consequent further limitation of national
competence.
The Court of Justice, as mentioned above, has expressly stated in
an agricultural case, that even the Community as such is bound by the
rules on the free movement of goods. Even this principle, however, is
not without certain exceptions. The Treaty provides, for example, in
Articles 103(4), 108 and 115, several express and implicit opportunities
for Community institutions to derogate from the provisions on the free
movement of goods. It seems from Les CommissionairesRunis that

these exceptions must be strictly interpreted. The possibility, however,
cannot be apriori ruled out that in certain circumstances, the Court of
Justice might accept a system if set forth in a harmonizing Directive
that liberalized trade further than the Dassonville rule of reason, but
nonetheless did not go so far as to fulfill completely the strict requirements of the basic principle of Dassonville. The wording of the rule of
reason it seems, leaves some room for such a view. The judgment in de
Peiper seems to exclude only those systems that would be more permissive for the Member States, than is the rule of reason.
The second general observation that can be made about the rule of
reason concerns other aspects of its contents. Dassonville in effect, dealt
with a measure for the prevention of unfair competition. Barents has
pointed out37 that the prevention of unfair competition, as well as two
other national policy aims can, in principle, benefit from the rule of
reason. Those other policy aims are the effectiveness of fiscal controls
and the protection of consumers. This list, however, is by no means
36 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 96. See notes 37, 103 infra.
37 [1979] S.E.W. at 750. See also Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffur Branntwein, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 464; GUi & Andres, [1980] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2071, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 146.
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exhaustive. Environmental protection and the conservation of biological resources, for example, also could be added. 8 Nevertheless, it
seems clear from the case law on Article 36, inter alia, that national
economic policy measures for regulating the market should not be
brought within the ambit of the rule of reason.3 9 Such a wide interpretation of the rule of reason would be unreasonable since the Treaty, for
example, in Articles 43, 75, 103 and 235, allows the Community itself
ample opportunity to take economic control measures that will serve
acceptable national policy aims, without giving rise to quantitative re"strictions between the Member States. The criterion of reasonableness
formulated by the Court of Justice in its exception to the basic principle
in Dassonville, as has been suggested above, seems to indicate that
trade must not be restricted further than is required to accomplish the
purpose regarded as reasonable. The exception further indicates that
arbitrary discrimination between domestic products and imports, or
against imports from different Member States, will not be tolerated.
There have been two recent cases concerning details of the rule of
reason. In the first case, E.G. Commission v. Belgium, 40 the Commission took Belgium to the Court of Justice over the same Regulations
that had been at issue in Dassonville. The Court of Justice, however,
held that Belgium had in fact amended the Regulations sufficiently to
satisfy the criterion of reasonableness. 4 1 The second case, Fietqe,42 concerned the labelling of liqueurs. There the Court of Justice examined a
prohibition of the sale of alcoholic drinks imported from other Member
States under a designation different from that required by national law.
The original labels were legally acceptable in the exporting Member
State. The prohibition, however, had the effect of necessitating alterations to the label on the imported drinks. The Court of Justice held
that such a prohibition could indeed fall within the ambit of Article 30
in those cases where the original labels provided information
equivalent to that demanded by the national legislation in question.
The Court of Justice also reaffirmed its view, that even an "all exemptions granted" attitude on the part of the national authorities, would
38 Cornelius Kramer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 440. See
also Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fulr Branntwein, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
39 Contra Van Empel, supra note 1, at 222.
40 E.C. Commission v. Belgium, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1761, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
216.
41 Id. at 1786-87, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 224.
42 Fietje, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3839.
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43
not suffice to make the prohibition acceptable.

Applying the Dassonville Basic Princ#le in Areas Where no Common
Organization Exists.- Certain Other Aspects
Generally in areas where no common organization of the market
exists, the cases fall into two major groups (various other groups are
discussed with particular reference to Article 36 below). The first
group concerns straight import bans. In several notable cases,' the
Court of Justice has held import restrictions on such varying products
as bananas, potatoes and lamb that originated in other Member States,
incompatible with Community law. Since the end of the transitional
period, any national market rules still existing absent a Community
common organization of the market, may not derogate from the Treaty
provisions on the free movement of goods.
The second general group of cases concerns national price-regulatory measures. There is a certain amount of difficulty here because in
most of these cases a common agricultural organization did indeed exist. Consequently, it is sometimes unclear to what extent the relevant
national measures were incompatible with Article 30, and additionally,
to what extent those same measures were incompatible with the scheme
for common organization of the market. For the moment, therefore,
only cases not involving a common agricultural policy will be
discussed.
The leading case of INNO v. ATAB 4 5 is most instructive here. In
Belgium, as commonly occurs on the Continent, manufactured tobacco
is retailed bearing tax labels. Belgian law prohibited the sale of tobacco at any price other than that printed on the label, because that
label price determined the tax on domestically produced and imported
tobacco products. With respect to the Belgian law, the Court of Justice
stated that:
Although a maximum price applicable without distinction to domestic
and imported products does not in itself constitute a measure having an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, it may have such an effect,
however, when it is fixed at a level such that the sale of imported products
becomes, if not impossible, more difficult than that of domestic
43 Id. at 3854.
44 Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs & Finance, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1383,
[19751 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 208; E.C. Commission v. United Kingdom, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1447, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 427; Meijer v. Department of Trade, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1387, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 398; E.C. Commission v. France, [1979] E. .Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2729, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418.
45 NV GB-INNO-BM v. Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Tabak, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2115, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283.
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products.46
Similarly, national price label restrictions would generally have only
internal effects, if prices were freely chosen by the manufacturer or importer, and imposed on the consumer by a national legislative measure
without distinction between domestic and imported products. The possiblity could not be excluded, however, that in certain circumstances
such a system might be capable of affecting intra-Community trade.
Furthermore, the Court of Justice stated that the effect of Article 5
prevented Member States from enacting measures that would enable
private undertakings to escape from the provisions of Articles 85-94.47
In any event, even if national legislative provisions encouraged abuse
of a dominant position, these provisions also would generally be incompatible with Articles 30-34 of the Treaty.4 8
While INNO v. A TAB concerned maximum prices and the Court's
attitude toward fixed prices (imposed by the State on private enterprise)
having a restrictive or distorting effect on competition, the van Tiggele
case4 9 involved minimum prices fixed for Dutch gin and vieux. In van
Ti'ggele, the fixed minimum price applied to domestic and imported
products without distinguishing between the two. Nevertheless, the
Court of Justice noted that such a fixed minimum could place imported
products at a disadvantage as compared with domestic products. The
Court of Justice then held, that a fixed minimum price of this kind, to
the extent that it prevented the lower cost of imported products from
being reflected in the retail price of those products, would be regarded
as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction. 0
Even the possibility of exemption for imported goods would not make
the fixed minimum price incompatibile with the basic principle of the
free movement of goods, because the necessary administrative procedures would still constitute a hindrance to trade.5 1
Although these preliminary rulings did not actually address the
issue, it clearly can be seen that Article 30 forbids national price regulatory measures and restrictions on competition imposed on companies
by the State to the extent that: (1) they permit a lower profit margin for
imported products than for domestic products (in the case of maximum
prices); (2) they hinder consumers taking advantage of lower cost prices
46
47
48
49
CL J.

Id. at 2148, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 284.
Id. at 2145, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 315-16.
Id. at 2148, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 316.
Openbaar Ministerie of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v. van Tiggele, [1978] E. Comm.
Rep. 25, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 528.
50 Id. at 39, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 546.

51 Id. at 40, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 547.
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for imported products (in the case of minimum prices); or (3) they
could lead to restriction or distortion of competition that could adversely affect trade between Member States (as has been shown in cases
relating to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty).
Finally on this point there is the Danis case 5 2 involving a Belgian
price-notification decree. Part of the scheme there included the power
to suspend price rises for a period of two months in certain circumstances.5 The defendants claimed that the duty of notification imposed on them by the ministerial order in question, amounted to a
measure forbidden under Article 30.54 The Court of Justice held that
the system of price control involved in Danis constituted such an Article 30 forbidden measure "to the extent to which it [made] the marketing of products imported from another Member State either impossible
or more difficult than that of national products or [had] the effect of
of national products to the detriment of imfavouring the marketing
'
ported products." "1
After the above look at some of the important cases on price regulations outside commonly-organized sectors, one can appreciate that
the Court of Justice does not share the Commission's view that measures equally applicable to domestic and imported products should not,
inprincople, fall within the ambit of Article 30.56 Instead it is the very
nature of price regulatory measures-and especially of maximum-price
regulations-that causes them not to beper se incompatible with Article 30. 'Unless actual provisions of particular maximum-price regulations lead to a different conclusion, they always leave open the
possibility that domestic and imported products may be sold at lower
prices unimpeded. The chances of competition then, depend on normal market forces. An actual restriction of trade, however, could result
either from measures that actually had the effect of limiting profit margins for imported products, or from fixing prices that leave no satisfactory profit-margin for higher quality imported products that cost more
to produce. It seems that this train of thought is not incompatible with
52 Openbaar Ministerie v. Danis, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3327, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.

492.
53 Id. at 3330, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 494.
54 Id. at 3332-33, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 495-96.
55 Id. at 3340, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 507.
56 This would certainly seem to be the case as far as trading rules in general are concerned.
Where obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from differences between national laws
which have not yet been harmonized are concerned, the Court of Justice seems more willing to
adopt a criterion based purely on discrimination. See S.A. des Grandes Distilleries Peureux v.
Directeur des Services Fiseaux de la Haute-Sa6ne et du Territoire du Belfort, [1979] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 897, 906, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 337, 375.
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the basic principle in Dassonville. Fixed minimum prices by their nature, nevertheless, are far more likely to be deemed incompatible with
Article 30, since such fixed minimums could hinder lower cost
imports.
Comfplications in the AgriculturalSector
Interpreting case law on Articles 30 and 34 in the agricultural sector is complicated by the fact that whenever a common organization of
the market exists, the national measures are tested cumulatively against
both Article 30 (or Article 34 depending on the case) and the relevant
agricultural Regulations. There are differences of opinion as to how
relevant this large body of case law is in sectors other than agriculture.
These differences of opinion stem from the fact that it is often unclear
to what extent the Court of Justice based its judgment on Article 30 or
34, and to what extent it based its judgment on the incompatibility of
the national measure with the relevant scheme of common organization. Primarily with respect to Article 34, legal thinking-including
that of the Commission-has been along wrong lines, as will be shown
below. The following discussion of agricultural case law will be limited
to only those cases relating to the interpretation of Article 30.58
That case law had already started by the time of Dassonville with
the InternationalFruit case.59 In InternationalFruit, the Court of Justice held that Articles 30 and 34 prohibited-apart from the exceptions
provided for by Community law itself-the application of a national
provision requiring, even as a formality, import or export licences or
any other similar procedure to intra-Community trade.60 Even a system where licences were automatically granted upon request without
being subjected to policy considerations, was within this prohibition
unless expressly or implicitly permitted by primary or secondary Community law. 61 This judgment, based only on Articles 30-34, is also of
57 For further discussion of the problems associated with price regulations, see MESTMAECKER, VEREINBARHEIT VON PREISREGELUNGEN AUF DEM ARZNEIMITrELMARKT MIT DEM RECiiT
DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTsCHAFTsGEMINsCHAFT (1979); WAELBRoCIc, LEs REGLEMENTATIONS

NATIONALES DE PRIX ET LE DROrr COMMTNAUTAIRE (1975); and the reaction to Waelbroeck by
VAN THEMAAT, De Gemeenschapsrechteliykegrenzen van het nationaleprifsbeleid,1976 S.E.W. 401.

58 One particular technical point should be mentioned here. Before the end of the transitional
period, agricultural regulations incorporated the wording of Articles 30 and 34. This was because
Article 30 was not yet directly applicable. Since the end of the transitional period, such repetition
is unnecessary and is no longer found in the Regulations.
59 International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1971] E.
Comm. CL J. Rep. 1107.
60 Id.at 1116.
61 Id.
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significance outside the agricultural sector. On the basis of Les Commissionaires Rbunis, it seems that secondary Community law could
only authorize such action if it were based firmly on primary Community law, for example Article 103(4).
Price regulatory measures have been the subject of a large number
of judgments inside the agricultural sector as well as out.62 An overview of these judgments gives a clear impression that even the Court of
Justice itself has come to give greater weight both to Article 30 and to
the system of agricultural organization. Indeed, a clear evolution can
be seen in the case law. In Galli,6 3 the Court of Justice accepted the
proposition that in areas where a common organization of the market
existed-and in particular whenever this was based on a common price
system-the Member States no longer had the power to intervene
through unilateral provisions in the mechanism of price formation set
up by the Community system. Thus, since the common organization of
the market effectively excluded the competence of the Member States,
any testing of the contents of the national measures against either Article 30 or the relevant system common organization became superfluous. This question regarding to what extent the working of the
common agricultural policy excludes any national interference in the
regulation of the market is also important in matters other than those
of price regulation. As far as price regulatory measures are concerned,
however, it seems that the Court of Justice retreated from this extreme
position in Tasca6 and SADAM. 65 From these two cases forward, the
'Court of Justice tested national measures against Article 30 (or its
equivalent in the relevant agricultural Regulation), as well as against
the system of the agricultural Regulation concerned.
In testing the national measure against the system of the agricultural Regulation, the Court of Justice looks at whether the national
price-measure jeopardizes the Community system-for example the
payment of agreed minimum prices for sugarbeets or the sale of certain
agricultural produce at agreed intervention prices-directly or even in62 See, e.g., Galli, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 47, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211; Tasca,
[1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 291, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183; SocietA SADAM v. Comitato
Interministeriale dei Prezzi, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 323, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183;
Procureur du Roi v. Dechmann, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1573, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 562;
Grosoli, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2621; Procureur G6n6ral v. Hans Buys, [1979] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 3203, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 493; Gaetano Toffoli, and Others v. Regione Veneto,
[1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3301; Openbaar Ministerie v. Danis and Others, [1979] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 3327, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 492.
63 [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 47, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211.
64 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 291, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183.

65 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 323, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183.
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directly. An important development, also of significance outside the
agricultural sector, can be perceived when testing price-measures
against Article 30. The Court of Justice in Tasca, after repeating the
basic principle of Dassonville, held that a maximum price, to the extent
"itapplied to imported products, was incompatible with Article 30
whenever that price was fixed at such a low level, that tradesmen wishing to import the product into the relevant Member State could do so
only at a loss. Since the judgment in Dechmann,6 6 this "loss-price criterion" has been strengthened by the further requirement that the maximum price (in casu a maximum profit margin for retailers) takes
sufficient account of the retailer's costs as well as ensure that the retailer
obtain fair recompense for his activities. If the profit margin failed to
meet these conditions and maximum retail selling prices were frozen,
then the common organization's price mechanism could be affected at
prior stages. Additionally, intra-Community trade could be affected by
reduced imports. This, then, is a fine example of testing price measures
by reference to Article 30, on the one hand, and to the Common organization affected on the other. It should be noted, however, that national
maximum retail profit margins are more likely to affect the common
organization at prior economic stages, than they are to lead to a reduction in imports. The Dechmann case illustrates that testing by reference
to the common organization affected, will more likely produce further
restrictions on the national competence to regulate prices, than will
testing by reference to Article 30. The criterion of a sufficient profit
margin would seem to apply mutatis mutandis to the application of Article 30 to price regulatory measures aimed at wholesalers, since they
are more important than retailers as far as imports are concerned. The
significance of this may indeed extend well beyond the agricultural sector, despite the fact that the criterion is based on both Article 30 and
the common organization of the market.
The case law of the Court of Justice in this field has continued to
develop further. In its recent judgment in Buys,6 7 concerning the effects of a price-freeze on milk-feed products, the Court of Justice reaffirmed its SADAM,6 8 Dechmann69 and Grosoi 7° judgments. Furthermore, it held that the rules on the free movement of goods contained in
Articles 30-34, prohibited the application of certain national pricefreeze rules to the products concerned if they came under the common
66
67
68
69
70

[1978]
[1979]
[1976]
[1978]
[19791

E. Comm.
E. Comm.
E. Comm.
E. Comm.
E. Comm.

CL J. Rep. 1573, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 562.
Ct. J. Rep. 3203, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 493.
Ct. J. Rep. 323, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183.
Ct. J. Rep. 1573, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 562.
CL J. Rep. 2621.
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organization of the relevant agricultural market. The national pricefreeze rules prohibited were those that excluded the possibility of passing on in selling prices any increase in the purchase prices of raw
materials or finished products imported from another Member State
when, as a result of that freeze, prices were at such a level that the
marketing of the imported products became either impossible or more
difficult than that of national products. Thus, it became clear that the
criterion was not restriced to only those circumstances where a loss
would be incurred. However, the Court of Justice altered its position in
Toffoli. 71 This case arose from a national measure that fixed the regional producer price for cow's milk.72 The decision to fix the milk
price had been made by the chairman of the Regional Council of
Veneto, Italy. The Court of Justice did not examine whether this national measure was compatible with Articles 30-34. Instead, it proceeded to examine whether this national measure was compatible with
the provisions of the common organization involved. Even more recently in Kefer & Delmelle,7 3 the Court of Justice confirmed the views it
adopted in such cases as Dechmann and Grosoli.
The other judgments in the agricultural sector that also concern
Article 30 cover a variety of subjects. A number of these cases, especially those concerning inspection rules, can be better examined in connection with Article 36 below.
The rule of reason in Dassonville played a very definite part in the
French wine cases.74 In those cases, French wine rules were upheld in
view of the lacunae in the Community rules with respect to the overalcoholization of wines. The Court of Justice deemed these French
rules reasonable subject to two conditions: first, that the presumption
of over-alcoholization be rebuttable, and second, that the presumption
be applied in such a way as not to disadvantage wines from other
Member States.
The rule of reason in Dassonville, therefore, need not always exclude a complementary national measure. The contention may have to
be modified in light of the judgment in Vriend.75 The rule of reason
71 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3301.
72 Id. at 3303.
73 Procureur du Roi v. Kefer, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 103.
74 Procureur G6n6ral a la Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux v. Arnaud, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1023, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490; Procureur de la R6publique A la Court d'appel Aix-en
Provence et Fdd6ration nationale des producteurs de vins de table et de vins de pays v. Lahaille,
[1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1053.
75 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 327, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 473.
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also played a part in the Kramer judgment.76 The Court of Justice in
Kramer, deemed national North Sea fishing quotas, set in anticipation
of Community action, temporarily justified because the quotas sought
to conserve fish stocks in the North Sea.
In its second Rivoira judgment,77 the Court of Justice decided that
under Regulation 2513/69, the power to fix quotas on imports from
third countries only applied to imports coming directly from those third
countries. Furthermore, this power did not apply to goods already in
free circulation within the Community (since that would be contrary to
basic principles) unless the Commission, acting under Article 115, had
expressly authorized such action. Following its first Rivoira judgment,78 the Court of Justice added that an importer could indeed be
asked certain questions regarding the country of origin. It limited the
inquiry of the importer, however, to questions indicating origin in so
far as the importer knew it, or could reasonably be expected to know it.
Finally, any further penalties for non-compliance could not be disproportionate to the purely administrative nature of the offense. A comparison in this last respect may be drawn with the judgment in Criel, 9
which did not concern the agricultural sector.
III. THE

CASE LAw ON ARTICLE

34

Case Law Outside the AgriculturalSector

When the Court of Justice formulated the basic principle in Dassonville, it was thought that it would apply also to Article 34. With the
benefit of hindsight, however, following the Bouhelier judgment ° concerning Article 34 in a non-agricultural context, there should have been
some doubt about this. In Bouhelier, the Court of Justice held that the
words "quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect"
in Article 34
must be understood as applying to rules adopted by Member States which
require in respect only of the export of certain goods either a licence or a
standards certificate which is issued in place of such licence and may be
refused if the quality does not conform to certain standards laid down by
76 Kramer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 440.
77 Procureur de la RMpublique v. Rivoira, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1979] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 456.
78 Cayrol v. Rivoira, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2261, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 253.
79 Criel v. Procureur de la R~publique, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1921, [1977] 2 Comm.

Mkt. L.R. 535.
80 Procureur de la R6publique de Basanqon v. Bouhelier, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 197,
[1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 436. See also Procureur de la R6publique de Basangon v. Bouheier,
[1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3151, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 541.
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the body issuing the said certificate8 1even if such certificate does not give
rise to the imposition of a charge.
However, since the case did not concern measures equally applicable to
domestic and imported products as well as those products destined for
export, it perhaps may be understandable that doubts about the application of the basic principle in Dassonville did not arise at the time.
Case Law Involving the AgriculturalSector
The first judgment of the Court of Justice in the agricultural sector
involving Article 34 was the van Haaster case.8 2 This case in fact concerned such equally applicable measures referred to above, and in particular related to a national regulation restricting the cultivation of
hyacinth bulbs. The system in issue was held incompatible with Article
10 of the relevant Community Regulation.8 3 Interestingly, when compared with the later judgment in Dassonville, van Haaster scrutinized a
restriction of production rather than an equally applicable restriction
on distribution. The Court of Justice viewed this restriction on production consistently with the later Dassonville criteria as able to affect trade
between Member States, even if only indirectly or potentially. A restriction on production by its very nature can always restrict the opportunities for export, especially in the bulbs sector where there is a great
deal of export trade. An analogous judgment concerning poultry was
set forth in van den Hazel.8 4 In this case, the Court of Justice held that
the relevant national measure was incompatible with the Community
system. The national measure was viewed as "constituting quantitative
restrictions capable of affecting, potentially at any rate, the system of
trade as it has been set up by the organization or the market."8 5
The adverse effect present in van den Hazel seemed to be inherently a potential hindrance to exports, bearing in mind the formulation
of the judgment. Because of this, the case apparently drew even more
of an analogy with the basic principle in Dassonville. In fact, the Court
of Justice seemed to be expanding the basic principle of Dassonville in
paragraph 22 of its judgment86 where it brought discrimination be81
82
Mkt.
83
84

[1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 205, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 445.
Officier van Justitie v. Van Haaster, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1123, [1974] 2 Comm.
L.R. 521.
Id. at 1135, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 534.
Officier van Justitie v. van den Hazel, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 901, [1980] 3 Comm.

Mkt. L.R. 12.
85 Id. at 910, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 22.
86 Id. at 911, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 23.
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tween producers and consumers, and distortions in trade within the
concept of quantitative restrictions capable of affecting trade.
In 1979 in the Groenveld case,8 7 the Court of Justice dealt with a
prohibition on the processing of horsemeat. There the Commission
and the Advocate-General had arrived at a conclusion, as far as incompatabililty with Article 34 was concerned,8 8 similar to the one adopted
in both the van Haaster and van den Hazel cases. In Groenveld, however, the Court of Justice declined to follow these cases. Instead, it held
that a national regulation prohibiting meat-products producers from
stocking, dealing in or processing horsemeat was not, in the present
state of Community law, incompatible with Article 34, as long as this
compatibility was further conditioned on the requirement that there be
no discrimination in treatment between produce destined for export
and that destined for home use.8 9 The reasoning set forth in Groenveld
offers little indication of the motives that led the Court of Justice to the
above conclusion regarding Article 34. Nevertheless, the judgment certainly showed that the Court was departing from the line it had taken
in van Haaster and van den Hazel. In Groenveld, the Court of Justice
initially pointed out that the horsemeat sector, unlike the plant and
poultry sectors, was not subject to a specific Community Regulation.90
Had the horsemeat sector been subject to such a Regulation, depending
on its content, the Court of Justice might well have decided Groenveld
differently. The language in the case, "in the present state of Community law," would seem to support this view.
Whenever a common organization of the market exists, all market
conditions must be the same for all participants in that market throughout the Community and must thus comply both with Articles 30-34, as
interpreted in the Dassonville formula (the first condition for application of the rule of reason was being fulfilled) and with the more or less
interventionist system of the common organization. For other cases the
judgment in Groenveld offers only a very general reason for the restrictive interpretation of Article 34. In paragraph 7 of the Groenveldjudgment, for example, the Court of Justice stated that Article 34
concerns national measures which have as their specific object or effect
the restriction of patterns of exports and thereby the establishment of a
diference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and
its export trade in such a way as to provide a particular advantage for
87 P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3409,
[1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 207.
88 Id. at 3415-16, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 214.
89 Id. at 3416, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 214.
90 Id. at 3415, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 213.
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natural production or for the domestic market of the State in question at
the expense of the production or of the trade of other Member States.
This is not so in the case of a prohibition like that in question which is
applied objectively to the production of goods of a certain kind without
drawing a distinction depending on whether such goods are intended for
the national market or for export.9 1
Thus it can be seen that the Court of Justice made a significant deviation from the broad view of restrictions on trade taken in the Dassonville judgment, in favor of the rather narrow criterion of
discrimination. No precise reasons for this change of view were given
in the judgment. Although Groenveld was a judgment of the Second
Chamber rather than of the full Court, it is no less authoritative.
Perhaps the explanation lies in the fundamental difference between the situations existing under Article 34 and the situations possible under Article 30. This particular explanation has already been
suggested elsewhere. 92 Equally applicable measures that restrict distribution and affect imports, by their nature, can in fact be disguised restrictions on imports, or at least produce the same restrictive effect.
Thus, the aim is to be especially vigilant against protectionism. Nevertheless, it is true that production restrictions "irrespective of the country of destination," similarly by definition, always restrict exports. 93 A
restriction on production irrespective of the product's destination, however, is not usually designed to protect producers or even consumers.
In principle, only measures that applied solely, or mainly to products
bound for export could have such effects.
Since a prohibition of the relevant processing ban in Groenveld
could have caused a real restriction of exports, (paragraph 8 of the
judgment) it is preferable, based on the general formulation of paragraph 7 quoted above, to refrain from drawing too many general conclusions from this case. Nevertheless, if the United Kingdom or the
Netherlands, for example, during a general shortage of either oil, or
natural gas production or distribution (whether for domestic or foreign
use), raised prices for North Sea oil or gas, irrespective of whether the
oil or gas concerned was for domestic or foreign use, they could quite
reasonably rely on Groenveld and thus resist any damage action for
losses resulting from the price increase.
Although Groenveld is potentially of great importance outside the
91 Id. at 3415, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 213 (emphasis added).

92 This explanation has been suggested by van Themaat in [1980] S.E.W. at 142.
93 See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. van Haaster, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1123, [1974] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 521; Officier van Justitie v. van den Hazel, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 901,
[1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 12.
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agricultural sector, it must be emphasised that a certain degree of caution should be exercised before too many general conclusions are
drawn from it. Even the above example from the field of energy shows
that the application of the Groenveld doctrine to other sectors may have
certain disadvantages for consumers in other Member States, even
though there is no discrimination involved as to the country of
destination.
The judgments in Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond9 4 and Pigs &
Bacon Commission v. McCarren & Co.95 concern, inter alia, the prob-

lem of whether national market regulations in the same sector as an
existing common organization are either incompatible with Articles 3034, on the one hand, or with the common organization as such on the
other. In both cases, the Court of Justice held that the abolition of
restrictions on intra-Community trade formed an integral part of the
relevant Community legislation, but that the national measures were
also incompatible with the common organization. The examination regarding Article 34, therefore, was incorporated with the examination of
the whole system of the common organization, just as was done in the
van Haaster and van den Hazel cases.

An even more recent case, Vriend,96 exhibits a still greater similarity to van Haaster and van den Hazel. In that case a Dutch magistrate
for Economic Matters convicted Vriend for selling chrysanthemum cuttings while not registered with the N.A.K.S. (the Dutch plant-testing
service).9 7 According to the Dutch legislation that set up the N.A.K.S.,
the right to produce (other than for one's own use), deal in or offer for
export any "cultivated plant" could be made dependent on registration
with an approved supervisory body.9" Vriend appealed to the Regional
Court of Appeal at Amsterdam which then made a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. Just as in the van
Haaster case, there existed a common organization of the market regarding the regulation of quality norms and trade in the products involved. In its preamble, the relevant Community Regulation stated
that the common organization of the market involved the internal removal of all obstacles to the free movement of the goods in question. 99
Because of this, Treaty articles regarding the lifting of tariff and trade
restrictions (and in particular Articles 30-34) were regarded as an inte94
95
96
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[19781 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2347, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177.
[1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2161, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 389.
[1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 327, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 473.
Id. at 329, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 473.
Id. at 329-31, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 473.
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gral part of the common organization concerned. Paragraph 8 of the
judgment in Vriend concluded that the relevant common organization
was based on the freedom of trade and, therefore, prohibited any national trade measure that restricted, even if only indirectly or potentially, intra-Community trade."° Thus paragraph 9 of the judgment
regarded trading in cultivated plants that was dependent on registration with a body such as the N.A.K.S., as definitely incompatible with
the common organization.'
Three comments may be made about Vrend. First, this judgment
confirms, that even after Groenveld, when a common organization of
the market exists, the principle of van Haaster and van den Hazel will
be maintained. Thus paragraph 8 of the judgment literally adopts the
formulation of the basic principle in Dassonville, even as far as Article
34 is concerned. In fact, the Court of Justice dropped the Dassonville
limitation of "trading rules" and spoke merely of "any national measure." It cannot be stated, however, that the Court of Justice in Vriend
(this time in plenary session unlike in Groenveld), has overruled
Groenveld, because in Vriend there existed a common organization of
the market. Nevertheless, the judgment does fall into the line of authority laid down in van Haaster and van den Hazel.
Second, it should be noted that it was not obligatory membership
as such that was held incompatible with Community law. Instead, incompatibility arose from the fact that capacity to trade in the relevant
products had been made dependent on membership. This would not
mean, however, that an arrangement would provide an acceptable national system, if there existed obligatory membership, along with the
capacity to trade in the relevant products subject to compliance with
the national quality norms laid down in pursuance of Community law.
It is clear from van Haaster as well as from the reasoning in Vriend,
that the incompatibility with Community law might remain even in
such an alternative situation as that outlined above. Thus a large part
of the Dutch agricultural quality legislation might be open to question,
at least in those areas where a common organization of the market exists. Thus, only more detailed Community implementing regulations
seem compatible with this judgment; certainly national implementing
measures anticipating Community measures would be unacceptable.
Both the Commission and the Dutch Government argued in favor of
the Dutch quality regulations, but the Court of Justice declined to
adopt their submissions.
lOO Id. at 339, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 485.
101 Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 485.
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The third observation regarding the Vriend judgment follows directly from the above. As stated above, obligatory membership as such
was not condemned; merely making the capacity to trade dependent on
membership, however, was condemned. The existence of the Dutch
public organizations (regulatory agencies called produktschap) was,
therefore, not under attack as such. However even the rules of autonomous producers or company associations may be affected by the developing case law of the Court of Justice, at least whenever they concern
areas where a common organization of the market exists.
IV.

THE CASE LAW CONCERNING ARTICLE 36

Article 36 in its entirety provides that:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of
public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
It follows clearly from the wording of Article 36 that in principle, legislation in the fields specified therein can fall within the prohibitions laid
down by Articles 30-34. If this were not the case then Article 36 would
be superfluous. Furthermore, the exceptions mentioned are only permitted to the extent that the prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit are justified on the grounds set out in Article
36. For this reason the exceptions are strictly interpreted. Thus, the
Court of Justice held in Commission v. Italy10 2 (the first Art Treasures
case) that Article 36, unlike Article 226, is concerned solely with measures of a non-economic nature. As was mentioned earlier, this view is
also clear from the rule of reason in Dassonville. The concept of public
policy in Article 36, therefore, includes neither the economic systems of
Member States, nor the legislation designed to implement such systems.
Examples of such legislation include price regulatory measures, economic legislation (both generally and in periods of shortages) and also
distribution laws. Such measures of a significantly interventionist nature can indeed hinder either directly or indirectly imports or exports.
Thus Articles 30-34 apply to these measures in full force, save only for
the emergency situations provided for in Articles 103, 108, 109, 223 and
224. The force of the judgment in the first Art Treasures case would
102 [1961] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 317, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 39.
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seem to exclude reliance on Article 36 as the justification for legal restrictions placed on activities such as giving presents, to the extent that
such restrictions affected the giving of presents by firms in other Member States. Indeed, the judgment would even seem to exclude attempts
to justify other measures aimed at ensuring orderly economic transactions or consumer protection. In these latter two instances, however,
the effect of the rule of reason in Dassonville may be such as to allow
these measures to be upheld.
It is settled law that the provisions of Article 36 cannot be used to
escape from the basic rules of any Treaty articles other than Articles
30-34. Particular attempts via Article 36 have been made to evade Articles 12 (abolition of customs duties and charges having an equivalent
effect), 85, 86, 92, 95 and 100. With respect to Article 100 it is clear that
any technical obstacles to trade removed from the ambit of Articles 3034 by the operation of Article 36, might remove most of the effectiveness of any harmonization provisions based on Article 100. In other
words, the harmonization Directives based on Article 100 cannot expand any competence left to the Member States through the operation
of Article 36.103 The Directives, however, in the interest of liberalizing
trade, can further restrict or remove, the competence of Member States
under Article 36 to maintain in force certain restrictions on imports and
exports. Article 36, therefore, does not give reserved powers to Member States.
Recently, certain developments in the case law in this field have
excited particular interest. In connection with German rules requiring
a minimum alcohol content for alcoholic drinks, the Court of Justice in
Rewe-Zentrale A G v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfur Branntwein14
stated quite uncontroversially, that absent common rules governing the
production and marketing of alcoholic beverages, Member States could
deal with these matters themselves. However, the Court of Justice
continued:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in
question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of pub103 See Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613, [1976] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 271; Tedeschi v. Denkavit, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1555, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 1; Denkavit v. Minister fir Ernahrung, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, [1980] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 513.
104 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494. See also Gilli & Andres,
[1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2071, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 146.
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lic health, 1the
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the
0 5
consumer.

It is absolutely clear that the above notion must be subject to the
application of the second sentence of Article 36. This follows from basic principles. Should additional authority, however, be needed to support this view, it can be found in the fact that the Court of Justice went
on to hold that where alcoholic beverages lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State were affected by a minimum alcohol content rule in another Member State, the latter rule could not be
compatible with Community law to the extent that it affected the importation of such beverages.10 6 The Court of Justice deduced that Article 36 would not aid the alcohol content rules involved, since as they
could not be said to be justified by any of the purposes set forth in
Article 36. This judgment induced the Commission to issue a statement, 107 basically in response to questions in the European Parliament,
regarding the directions that future harmonization activities by the
Commission would have to take. The statement also addressed the circumstances where a prohibition of importation and sale in one Member State of a product lawfully produced and marketed in another
Member State, would be incompatible with Community law. The
Commission's statement provided that where such a product suitably
and satisfactorily fulfils the legitimate objective of a Member State's
own rules (such as was mentioned in the above quotation from the
judgment in Rewe), a prohibition by the importing country of its sale
cannot be justified by claiming that the imported product fulfils the
objective of the national rules in a way different from that in which
domestic products do. 108 It would require another article to comment
on all the possible implications of this important statement.
Most of the case law on Article 36 has been concerned with patents, trademarks, copyright and analogous matters; other cases have
concerned the exceptions based on public health, animals and plants 10 9
105 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung far Branntwein, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. at 662, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508-09.
106 Id. at 674, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 510.
107 23 O.J. EuR. COMm. (No. C 256) 1 (1980).
108 Id. at 2.
109 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammer, [19751 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 843, [1975] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 599; Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 613, [1976] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 271; Bauhuis v. The Netherlands State, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 5; Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1355, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 650; Tedeschi v. Denkavit, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1555, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1;
Denkavit v. Minister fur Emahrung, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
513. See also Barents, [1979] S.E.W. 218.
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and one case involved pornography. 110 Since the judgment in Deutsche
Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte,"I significant developments have taken place in the field of industrial and intellectual
property. 12 The possible areas of conflict between industrial, commercial and analogous property rights, on the one hand, and the Community provisions on the free movement of goods on the other, arise from
actions recognized by national law for any infringement of patents,
trademarks and the like, granted by one state's laws that may occur
when persons other than the holder trade or attempt to trade in the
protected product. To the extent that national laws permit such actions
without restrictions, they would enable patent and trademark holders
to divide the Community into different national markets and thus, for
example, to pursue a different pricing policy in each country. Also,
whenever a protected product was put on the market by the patent or
trademark holder, or with his permission (e.g., under a license arrangement), in one Member State, he could always seek to prevent its importation into other Member States.
From the economic viewpoint, the danger is that anti-competitive
practices by firms may develop in such instances. Therefore, it was no
surprise when these intellectual and commercial property problems
arose in cases concerning Article 85 of the Treaty. 3 It rapidly became
apparent, however, that these infringement actions could be brought
against those who imported products legally marketed elsewhere, even
though such actions were not the result of any anti-competitive agreements. Regarding these actions, the Court of Justice stated that the
mere ownership of a patent or trademark did not of itself necessarily
lead to a position of economic strength, and thus could not be the sole
basis for an action under Article 86 of the Treaty.
Since most of these actions were brought under national patent or
trademark laws, it was obvious that the Court of Justice would examine
the national laws in light of Article 36. The doctrine developed
through the cases by the Court of Justice is summarized next. Article
36 leaves those rights granted in the sphere of industrial and commerical property by national law, intact as such. Thus, the existence of
110 Regina v. Henn & Darby, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3795, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 246.
111 [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631.
112 See, e.g., Ludding, Hel Mededingingsrecht in de EEG en de rechien van industrieleen cormerciele eigendorn, DEVENTER (1979). See also Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH & K-Tel Int'l v.
GEMA, [1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 44.
113 See Consten & Grandig-verkaufs v. Commission, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1966]
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418; Parke, Davis v. Probel & Centrafarm, [1968] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 65,
[1968] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47.
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those rights is not incompatible with Articles 30-34.114 The following
analogy, therefore, can be drawn with property rights in general: just
as Article 222 of the Treaty leaves the regulations of property rights in
general to the Member States, it can be deduced from Article 36 that
the regulation of industrial and commercial property rights is also left
in the hands of the Member States by the Treaty.1 15 In principle, only
community legislation based on Articles 100 or 235 of the Treaty could
affect such national legislation.1 16 The patent or trademark holder, for
example, can seek to prohibit the importation of the patented products
by a firm from another Member State that has imitated a patented
product in the importing Member State without the holder's permission, or similarly a firm that has illegally affixed his mark or a similar
mark to his products.
The analogy with the regulation of property rights can be carried
further. The fact that the Treaty leaves unaffected the regulation of
property rights in goods, does not prevent Articles 30-34 from affecting
national measures that concern trade. Indeed, Article 36 does not prevent Articles 30-34 from affecting certain aspects regarding the exercise
of patent or trademark rights. Specifically, the basic principle in Dassonville, covers rights that are exercised in a manner likely to hinder
trade between Member States. Moreover, the disposal of patent and
trademark rights by agreement can fall within the ambit of Article 85,
whenever the conditions required by that Article are fulfilled. The case
law of the Court of Justice seeks to eliminate from the specific object of
patent and trademark rights, any disposal or exercise of these rights
that cannot be said to be properly part of that specific object. The
Court of Justice in the Sterling Drug case, 11 7 regarded the specific object of a patent, either directly or through license agreements, as the
exclusive right of the holder or licensee to use the invention concerned
for the manufacture of products, to be the first to market the same, and
to bring actions seeking to prevent infringements of these rights. As far
as trademarks were concerned, in Winthrop,1" 8 the Court of Justice
viewed the specific object as the grant to the holder of the exclusive
114 See Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 480; Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.

L.R. 480.
115 See, eg., Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfabz, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, [1980] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 42.
116 Compare Terrapin Overseas Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039,
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482 with notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
117 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
118 Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
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right to use the trademark, the right to first market a product. This
view, therefore, would protect the holder from competitors who could
lower the position and reputation of the trademark, through its misuse
or false application to other products. However, further rights recognized by the laws or case law in Member States, such as the right to
prevent importation from another Member State where products were
sold by the holder of such rights or with his permission, were viewed as
not being covered by the first sentence of Article 36.
Various complications can arise when two totally independent
firms are entitled to use the same trademark, or easily confusable trademarks. These situations were present in Van Zuyien Freres v. Hag
AG" 9 and Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v. Terranova Industrie.120 Further
complications can arise from the repackaging of products by other
firms, for example, when a large consignment is split up into many
smaller units. Two important judgments on this particular problem are
Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertrebsgesellschaft12 t and Centrafarm BV v. American Home Products Corp. 12 In the latter case a
further problem arose since the company used different trademarks for
the same product in different countries. In all these cases, it can be
deduced from the definition of the specific object in Winthrop 2 3 that
the trademark holder may, in principle, bring an action for infringement against a party that affixes the holder's, or a similar mark, to his
products and then markets them. Thus, even a prohibition on importation is justified in principle under the first sentence of Article 36. This
justification, based in principle on the grounds of the specific object,
however, does not exclude the possibility that the misuse of such an
exercise of rights can be forbidden. When such a misuse occurs, therefore, the second sentence of Article 36 applies and the exercise can be
seen as an arbitrary discrimination, or as a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
The second sentence of Article 36 has been interpreted in several
important cases' 24 and, as mentioned above,' 2 5 the analogy of the rule
of reason in Dassonville is of interest here, even though the rule of rea'19 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127.
120 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482.
121 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 217.
122 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 327.
123 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
124 See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613, [1976] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 271; Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgese1schaft, [1978] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 217; Centrafarm v. American Home Products Corp.,
[1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 327.
125 See generaly section II of this article.
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son also contains certain other criteria such as the temporary nature of
exceptions from the basic principle, lasting only until Community regulations deal with the matters involved. The case law on Article 36,
however, shows that the Court of Justice will allow restrictions on imports and exports based on Article 36, only to the extent such restrictions are really necessary to further the interests specified in Article 36.
Where these interests can be protected by measures that are less restrictive on trade, then only such measures will be permitted, with the borderline being that the reasonable needs of normal administrative
procedures must be kept in mind.' 2 6 It also seems that the Court of
Justice will examine whether the second sentence of Article 36 does in
fact prohibit measures, only after examining whether the hindrances to
trade can in principle be justified under the first sentence of Article 36.
This is because even measures that, in principle, can be justified, are
subject to misuse. The following open question remains however:
when a justified import ban on one product may have side-effects on
the possibilities of importing other products, does the second sentence
of Article 36 apply, and could it operate to prevent the justification
from being effective? Such questions may well arise concerning tie-in
sales of one product protected by a patent or trademark, to another
product not so covered. It would seem to follow from the narrow interpretation principle of Article 36 that even such a tie-in sale may be seen
as a disguised restriction on trade, if in fact the possibility of importing
the non-protected product is restricted. This problem is primarily of
interest in cases where proceedings under Article 85 or 86 are
impossible.
V.

WHO ARE THE ADDRESSEES OF ARTICLES

30-36?

It has already been stated that Articles 30-36, although addressed
to the Member States, also bind the Community Institutions themselves
unless otherwise provided by the Treaty.'2 7 In this regard, certain
problems in connection with Article 103 will be discussed in part VI,
infra.
The case law provides that affected individuals may rely on Articles 30, 34 and 36 whether they are plaintiffs or defendants in civil,
criminal or administrative proceedings; indeed, many preliminary rulings under Article 177 have arisen from such proceedings. It is still an
126 See Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613, [1976] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 271. But cf Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Btmdesmonopolverwaltung fatr Branntwein, [1979]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
127 See Socit 6 Les Commissionnaires Rdunis, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 927.
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open question, however, as to whether in certain circumstances Articles
30 and 34 may impose duties on as well as confer rights to individuals.
In other words the question is whether these Articles, together with the
exceptions provided for in Article 36, also apply to private (as opposed
to State) restrictions on trade. One example of such private restrictions
might be a collective boycott of imports by employees seeking to resist
any threat to their jobs posed by imports. Another example might be a
collective refusal by employees, acting in sympathy with colleagues
striking in another Member State, to handle products destined for export. A third example might be private behavioral standards for industrial products.
Certainly the wording of Articles 30-36 would not seem to exclude
their application to such actions. An analogy can perhaps be drawn
from the judgment of the Court of Justice in Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale.2 ' That case concerned Articles 4849 of the Treaty, which seek to achieve a freedom of movement for
persons and services similar to the freedom of goods sought by Articles
30-36. Indeed, in Defrenne v. SA.BENA 2 9 concerning Article 119 and
the principle of equal pay for men and women for equal work, the
Court of Justice again came to an analogous result. It is by no means
clear, however, whether the Court of Justice has adopted the above
suggested analogy. Van Gerven, 131 indeed, argues that it has. Van
Gerven's argument is based on the judgments in Sterling Drug and
Winthrop 131 concerning individuals' patent and trademark rights, respectively. In these judgments, however, the Court of Justice can be
said to have taken the patent and trademark legislation itself, and classified it as a measure having an effect equivalent to that of a quantitative restriction. The "equivalent effect" of these measures comes from
the fact that the legislation allows individuals (with the aid of the
Judge) to bring about a state of affairs that would be incompatible with
the principle of free movement of goods enshrined in Community
law. 132 Therefore, the question relating to private restrictions on imports or exports that are not indirectly aided by a State measure must
128 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1405, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 320.
129 [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 98.
130 Van Gerven, The Recent Case Law of/he Court of Justice ConcerningArticles 30 and 36 of
the EEC Treaty, 14 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 5 (1977).
131 Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L. R. 480; Centrafarm v. Winthrop, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R_
480.
132 See Ehlermann in KOMMENTAR ZUM E.W.G.-VERTRAG 276 (2d ed. Von der Groeben, von
Boeckh & Thiesing eds. 1974).

Restrictions of Free Trade
3:577(1981)
remain completely open. However, remembering the analogous cases
just cited, it seems that an affirmative answer is certainly possible. The
objection that the first sentences of Articles 31 and 32, Articles 33(1)
and 34(2) expressly concern only State measures, will not prevail. The
standstill-provision of Article 62 on the freedom to provide services
(which is analogous to the provisions of the first sentence of Article 31),
did not prevent the Court of Justice from accepting the proposition that
Article 59 applied to private restrictions on the freedom to provide
services. 133 Indeed, the very wording of the central Articles-30 and
34(l)-and their central role in the Treaty, may indicate that they extend to cover private restrictions on trade. Even though State measures
are obviously those first thought of in the context of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, the very extension of the prohibition
to measures having an equivalent effect, shows that any attempted evasion by means of collective action must in fact fall within the prohibition. The rule of reason in Dassonville, nevertheless, would permit
certain reasonable hindrances on imports or exports for non-economic
purposes.
VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARTICLES

30-36

WITH SOME OF THE

OTHER ARTICLES OF THE TREATY

In order to show in more detail the importance of Articles 30-36 in
the system created by the Treaty, it is necessary to discuss their relationship with Articles 52, 85, 86, 90, 92, 100 and 103-109. The application of Articles 30-36 to the common agricultural policy has already
been discussed above.
Article 52
The relationship of Articles 30-36 with Article 52 is important, because the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 52 includes
the right to take up andpursue activities as self-employed persons, and
the right to set up and manage undertakings under conditions laid
down by the law of the country for its own nationals. The principle of
equal treatment for the self-employed foreigner vis-a-vis nationals of
the particular Member State concerned has been enshrined in Article
52. This same principle has been negotiated in agreements between
States since the middle ages. It would appear from the inclusion of the
word "pursue" in Article 52, that the above principle of equal treat133 Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep.
1405, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 320.
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ment applies to the pursuit of economic activities by self-employed foreigners, and not merely to the establishment of such activities. As far
as Article 30 is concerned, this view of the principle of equal treatment
does not give rise to demarcation problems since Article 30 does not
concern the foreigner's exercise of his activities but rather only the importation of goods. With respect to Article 34, however, there may well
be demarcation problems with Article 52. Indeed, if the basic principle
in Dassonville were to be applied without more, then every law concerning establishment could be incompatible with Article 34 because of
its inherent potential or indirect effect on exports. 134 Such an interpretation would render the whole Chapter of the Treaty dealing with the
right of establishment pointless. In addition to Article 52, the co-ordination provisions in Article 57 clearly contemplate provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
concerning the taking up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons. Thus, legislation that does not discriminate against nationals of
other Member States, when those nationals are in pursuit of their activities as self-employed persons, must be compatible with Article 52 even
if the legislation leads indirectly to restrictions on exports. A rational
interpretation of the Treaty system must then lead to the conclusion
that such legislation also is not incompatible with Article 34. As a lex
specialis, Article 52 must take priority over the general prohibition of
Article 34 in those cases where legislation compatible with the former
might be incompatible with the latter. This interpretation of Article 52
supports the conclusion that Groenveld135 is indeed of more general significance. An exception to this general argument, however, must be
made if there are sectors where a common organization of the market
exists. Such a common organization gives rise to criteria in addition to
those supplied by Articles 30, 34 and 52 against which national legislais supported by the van Haaster, van
tion must be judged. This view
1 36
den Hazel and Vriend cases.
134 See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. van Haaster, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1123, [1974] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 521; Officier van Justitie v. van den Hazel, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 901,
[1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 12; Pieter Vriend, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 327, [1980] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 473.
135 P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en vlees, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3409,
[1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 207.
136 The recent judgments of the Court of Justice in the cable television cases, Procureurdu Roi
v. Debauve and S.A. Coditel v. S.A. Cine Vog. Films (not yet reported), are most instructive in this
context as the Court of Justice did not adopt the view of the Commission and. the AdvocateGeneral that the provisions on services were comparable to the prohibitions of Articles 12 and 30.
Thus the Court of Justice rejected a broad interpretation of the services provisions in the Treaty.
These judgments confirm the relevance of the provisions of Article 36 and the case law on this
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Articles 85-90
In many of the cases that discussed Article 30, the actual subjectmatter of each case concerned either anti-competitive agreements between companies (Article 85), or possible abuses of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. Precisely because anticompetitive agreements or practices, together with legal or administrative rules concerning imports, can constitute "measures having an
equivalent effect," it was necessary for the interpretation of Articles 30,
85 and 86 to be consistent. This same need for consistency exists whenever it is accepted that anti-competitive practices do not themselves legally constitute "measures having an equivalent effect." Thus it is
scarcely surprising that the basic principle in Dassonville adopted the
criteria of interpretation laid down by the Court of Justice when it examined the notion of affecting trade between Member States in Article
85.137 The question of how far the interpretation of the exceptions contained in Article 85(3) may be relevant towards the interpretation either
of the rule of reason in Dassonville, or of the provisions of Article 36,
has been examined elsewhere.138 It is sufficient for our purposes here
to state that the criteria in Article 85(3) (of proportionality and of competition with respect to a substantial part of the products in question
not being eliminated) seem to be of significance for the interpretation
of Article 36. However, this significance cannot be too firmly asserted
in light of the positive-justification criteria of Article 85(3), where the
case law supports the narrower view advanced above.
The judgment in INNO v. ATAB 139 provides that the connection
between Articles 80 and 86, on the one hand, and Articles 30-36, on the
other, can be of the greatest significance. In INNO v. A TAB, the Court
of Justice made it clear that although Article 86 was directed at undertakings, the Treaty explicitly prohibited Member States from taking
measures that could jeopardize the attainment of its objectives. It imposed on them a duty, therefore, not to adopt, or maintain in force, any
measures that could deprive Article 86 of its effectiveness. Therefore,
the Court of Justice stated that a national measure having the effect of
article to the services provisions. See Bennett, The Debauveand Coditel Cases, 5 EUR. L. REV. 224

(1980).
137 Establissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs--GmbH v. Commission, [1966] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418; Soci6t6 Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau ulm GmbH, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357; Volk v.
Establissements Vervaeke, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273.
138 van Themaat, Zum Verhaltnis Zwischen Artikel 30 and Ar/ikel 85 EWG-Vertrag,
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(Gutzler, Herior & Kaiser eds. 1976).

[1977] E. Comm. qt J. Rep. 2115, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283.
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facilitating activities that breached Article 86, generally would be incompatible with the provisions of Articles 30 and 34. 140 Similar considerations obviously apply with respect to measures facilitating a breach
of Article 85. Since the Court of Justice made it quite clear that it
would not tolerate measures enabling private undertakings to escape
from the effects of the provisions of Treaty Articles 85-94, the Court of
Justice proceeded in INNO v. ATAB to examine certain problems regarding Article 90, in particular, but found that the problems could be
solved by holding that Article 90 was only a particular application of a
general principle and, therefore, covered by the statements already
made.
Article 92
Article 92, which proclaims in principle that State aids are incompatible with the common market, is also covered by the passages from
INNO v. ATAB quoted above. National aids that place the production
of national undertakings in a better position on the domestic market
than do imports from other Member States, without more, could beper
se regarded as measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative
restriction on imports. Again, however, Article 92 takes the form, with
respect to measures having an equivalent effect, of a lex specialis, and
thus has precedence over Article 30. An accurate borderline, therefore,
has to be drawn between Articles 30 and 92, and drawing such a line is
by no means always easy in practice. Unlike the delimitation between
Articles 34 and 52 of the Treaty, the significance of the borderline between Articles 30 and 92 lies as much in the fact that a national judge
cannot apply Article 92 directly (although he can apply Article 30), as
in the fact that Article 92 (unlike Article 30 but similar to Article 85)
provides for exceptions on economic grounds. In cases of significant
subsidies and of exemptions from fiscal, social or other governmentimposed burdens, the borderline should not create great problems.
However, if national firms were to be accorded privileged status by
government purchases despite the fact that they charged higher prices
then problems could indeed arise. Economically, the payment of the
higher prices could be comparable with a subsidy to the relevant firm.
In the opinion of the present writers, however, the correct view in such
a case must be that the stronger provisions of Article 7 and 30 take
precedence whenever these Articles are applicable in circumstances
140 Id. at 2144-45, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 316.
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where there is also discrimination based on nationality or a measure
having an equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction involved.
Article 100
As discussed above,14 1 neither Article 100 nor harmonization Directives based on it can detract from the strict principles of Articles 3036. They also serve to limit the applicability of Article 36. In addition
to the harmonization Directives on technical and administrative obstacles to trade, 142 another good example is Directive 77/62143 on co-ordination procedures for public supply contracts. A harmonization
Directive, however, need not necessarily lead to such a strict application of the basic principle in Dassonville, when applied to cases falling
within the ambit of Article 34. This can be seen in connection with the
common agricultural policy. The basic rule of Dassonville can be inyoked for purposes of interpreting Article 34, only if the harmonization
Directive expressly so provides. This conclusion should also apply to
production limits, quality rules and other provisions that are applicable
to domestic production. Such regulation of commercial behavior
which can, by its very nature, also lead to export restrictions would not
seem to fall within Article 34 on its own.'"
Applying the basic principle in Dassonville to the interpretation of
Article 34, therefore, would seem to be appropriate only in situations
that involve a common organization of a particular market. Harmonization Directives have less far-reaching consequences with respect to
Community policy than do the Regulations providing for common organization. It would seem, therefore, that less severe conclusions
should be drawn with respect to harmonization Directives, than were
drawn in common organization cases such as Vriend. As stated above,
even as far as Article 30 is concerned, both the rule of reason in Dassonville and the exceptions in Article 36 may be displaced by a stricter
requirement which is, nevertheless, not as severe as the basic principle
in Dassonville itself. In fact, a harmonization Directive will always
achieve its aims to the extent that it facilitates further liberalization,
otherwise impossible without the Directive.
141 See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
142 See P. SLOT, TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES TO TRADE IN THE EEC (1975).

143 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 1 (1977).
144 Cf. Officier van Justitie v. van Haaster, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1123, [19741 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 521; Officier van Justitie v. van den Hazel, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 901, [1980] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 12; P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, [1979] E. Comm.
Ct. . Rep. 3409, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 207.
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Articles 103-109
In cases presenting difficulties or serious threat of difficulties regarding a Member States' balance of payments, the Commission, acting
under the provisions of Article 108(3), can authorize the Member State
involved to take such protective measures as the Commission determines. These protective measures may even go so far as to make inroads on the provisions of Article 30. Similarly, where a sudden
balance of payments crisis occurs the Member State itself, under the
provisions of Article 109, may take such protective measures as it
deems necessary, although the Commission and the Council may
change them afterwards. These measures could also include derogations from Article 30. It should be remembered, however, that attempts
to justify unilateral short-term economic policy measures restricting
imports or exports by reference to Article 103 (dealing with the coordination of short-term economic policies) have been expressly rejected by
45
the Court of Justice.1
Nevertheless, it is still undecided just how far the Community itself is bound by Articles 30 and 34 in the application of Article 103,
apart from the case of supply difficulties expressly mentioned in Article
103(4). It would seem from Les Commissionnaires R~unis146 that, in
principle, the Communities must be so bound. It is also not easy to
understand why short-term economic policy Directives, Regulations or
Decisions should induce measures having an effect equivalent to that of
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, except in a situation
such as that mentioned in Article 103(4).
Generally, short-term economic policy measures will affect the
macro-economic policies of the Member States. However, to the extent
that short-term economic policy Directives from the Council could lead
to restrictive budget policies, it can be appreciated that a restrictive
budget policy could lead to a credit squeeze that could damage imports.
At first, it might be thought that such a Directive would have to comply
with the basic principle in Dassonville on the ground that it could always restrict imports indirectly. Despite this thought, the basic principle may well be inapplicable because such a Directive (and even a
restrictive budget policy itself) would not restrict imports in a specific
manner and bind businesses in the way that rationing provisions or
other quantitative restriction on imports would. Despite its wide-ranging and diffuse effects on imports, a Directive or restrictive budget pol145 See, e.g., SADAM v. Comitato Interministeriale de Prezzi, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 323,
[1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 183.
146 Socit6 Les Commissionnaires R6unis, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 927, 947.
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icy of the type under discussion should not be viewed as falling within
the set of measures covered by Article 30. Even the indirect restrictive
effect of a general measure controlling wages on credit and imports
seems far too wide-ranging and diffuse to be comparable to the effects
of a rationing measure. Unlike the legislation considered in the caselaw of the Court of Justice, a measure controlling wages also does not
affect the production or distribution of goods. Presently, connecting
Directives issued under Article 103 with the provisions of Articles 30
and 34, primarily is of practical interest with respect to energy-saving
measures. It is obviously preferable, therefore, to base such Directives
expressly on Article 103(4) since it allows as much deviation from Articles 30" and 34 as may be necessary. However, as observed above, any
unilateral deviation from these Articles on the part of a Member
State-i.e., without the express authorization of the Council-that is
justified on the grounds of energy shortages and Article 103, will not be
tolerated.
Finally, it may be asked whether a strict application of Articles 30
and 34, based on the case law of the Court of Justice, would remove the
danger of frequent attempts by the Member States to invoke Article
103 improperly. This point, however, has been dealt with sufficiently
above. Apart from the shortage situation provided for in Article
103(4), therefore, it seems that even the Council is bound by the provisions of Articles 30 and 34 when applying Article 103. Les Commissionnaires Riunis seems to indicate that any abuse of Article 103, that
allows Member States to make inroads into the fundamental principle
of the free movement of goods, will be prohibited. Nevertheless, there
may well be significant practical problems to face should the Council
decide to use the provisions of Article 103 in the present economic crisis in a manner differently than they have so far. Such might be the
case, for instance, if there were a co-ordinated use of government
purchasing power to encourage spending in certain sectors, or if other
crisis measures were taken as matters of sectoral policy.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Most Important Points
It seems that apart from agricultural matters, the Court of Justice
recently has been preoccupied with the free movement of goods and the
customs union. 4 7 In fact, in 1979 the number of cases concerning Arti147
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cles 30-36 exceeded the total number of judgments relating to Articles
85 and 86. The case law of the Court of Justice on Articles 30-36 is
developing a more significant and coherent pattern, and indeed the
judgments in Groenveld and Vriend have elucidated the limits of the
application of the basic principle in Dassonville with respect to Article
34.
The main threads of the case law on Articles 30-36 can be
summarized as follows. First, the basic principle in Dassonville applies
with its full force to Article 34, as well as to Article 30, whenever the
market involved is subject to common organization. National measures are then examined cumulatively against these Articles and the provisions of the particular common organization. Second, in cases where
there is no common organization of the market involved, the basic
principle in Dassonville (except for the rule of reason) is confined to
Article 30. As far as Article 34 is concerned a material discrimination
criterion is applied. Thus, Article 34 applies only when exports are affected more than products marketed at home. Conflict with the provisions of Article 52, therefore, is avoided by this deviation from the
Dassonville principle. Third, although the situation regarding qualitative rules for proper economic intercourse is uncertain, the rule of reason in Dassonville, probably like the exceptions in Article 36, applies
only to reasonable measures that do not have economic-policy
8
motives. 14
A fourth point is that while the rule of reason does not apply at all
in circumstances involving a common organization of the market, it is
less certain whether or not the rule applies in the presence of a harmonization Directive. The case law would seem to leave open the possibility that a less far-reaching exception to the basic principle, set forth
in the harmonization Directive concerned, could supplant the rule of
reason. Fifth, the case law on Article 36, to a large extent, can be
viewed as a simple application of the principle-exceptions must be
construed strictly.' 4 9 More particularly, with respect to the case law on
intellectual property rights, this view led to the distinction between the
148 For a discussion of the compatibility of measures designed to prevent tax frauds (where the
temporary tax-free importation of certain products is concerned) with Article 30, see the recent
case of Giovanni Carciati,[19801 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2773, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 274.
149 A further example of this can be seen in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission
v. FrenchRepublic, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2299, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 743, in which
certain discriminatory restrictions on the advertising of alcoholic beverages were held to be in'compatible with Article 30. The Court of Justice recognized the importance of the public health
arguments but held nevertheless that the rules constituted an arbitrary discrimination within the
meaning of the second sentence in Article 36 and therefore could not be permitted.
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perfectly justified existence of such rights, and the fact that in certain
circumstances their exercise could be prohibited. Finally, the case law
exhibits clear guidelines that are consistent with the Treaty system for
determining the dividing line between Articles 30-36 and other articles
of the Treaty. These consistent guidelines apply just as much to articles
concerning the achievement of a common market, as to those articles
dealing with the progressive approximation of the economic policies of
the Member States. Thus, an extremely far-reaching common economic system, such as that for agriculture, is made splendidly compatible with the concurrent principle of the free movement of goods.
Extensive planning and unity of the market, therefore, can indeed coexist peacefully. This fact might be of great significance for new areas
of integration in the future.
The Signifcance of the Case Law in Assessing the State
of the Process of Integration
As Van Empel and Slot have argued,1 50 the case law reveals a
highly developed notion of federalization of the Communities. The
competence of the Member States, Slot contends, is more restricted
than the competence of individual States in the United States of
America.
It is significant, however, that Van Empel and Slot draw very divergent conclusions from this proposition regarding the federalization
of the Communities. Van Empel feels that the Court of Justice goes too
far, and that in the current state of the process of integration, the Court
of Justice should allow more room for national economic planning
measures in accordance with the principle of alternatives."' 1 Additionally, he contends that the case-law does not provide complete certainty
for those affected since the outcome of the derogation arguments in any
specific case is not completely predictable.' 5 2 He expects, therefore,
first, that the tension will increase between three elements, namely, the
common market, conscious economic planning and a federative organization, and second, that the maintenance of the common market in particular will come under severe strain.'5 3 Van Empel claimed support
for this contention from an article by Ehlermann, written in 1979.1-4 In
that article, Ehlermann contended that if the Court of Justice maintains
150 See Van Empel & Slot, note 1, supra.
151 Id.at 225.
152 Id.at 230-31.
153 Id.at 231-32.
154 Ehlermann, DasVerbot derMassnahmengleicher Wirkung in derRechisprechungdes Gerichtshofs, HAMBURG, DEUTSCHLAND, EUROPA (Stadter & Thieme eds. 1979).
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its wide definition of measures that have an effect equivalent to that of
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, it will soon find itself
faced with a dilemma. The dilemma is whether to restrict it defacto,
despite formally maintaining the broad definition, or to interpret Article 36 broadly. Ehlermann suggested that in the judgment of the Court
of Justice in Kramer,15 there were indications of the first approach,
whereas in Dassonvile, there were indications of the second. Furthermore, Ehlerman implicitly recognizes that it is impossible, given political realities, to estimate the extent of the growing need for economic
planning measures in connection with the co-ordination of economic
policies.
Slot, however, takes a more positive view of the case law and states
that there is no need for anxiety about the supervisory role of the Court
of Justice over the removal of trade restrictions. Such a role, according
to Slot, is necessary given past experiences in federal systems. Thus,
the example of the United States of America's federal legislative process is authority for the proposition that positive legal powers at the
federal level, even when granted by majority decisions, are no panacea
against restrictions on trade at the State level. Positive legal powers,
therefore, are not a useful alternative to the role of case law in this
regard. The example of the United States does show, however, that the
mere existence of trade restrictions need not be absolutely disastrous
with respect to the development of a common market.156 Nevertheless,
he does acknowledge that in the European Communities, with its diverse cultural, policy and legal traditions, stricter vigilance is necessary
to ensure that a common market is achieved and maintained, than was
needed in the United States of America.
The fact that the case law of the Court of Justice in this field can
lead to increased tension within the Communities can be demonstrated,
for example, by the reaction of the French. The French, for quite some
time, refused to implement the judgment of the Court of Justice concerning restrictions on the import of lamb prior to the establishment of
a common organization for mutton and lamb. Another example was
the British reluctance to implement the judgment on the use of
tachographs in the face of deep-seated opposition on the part of the
trade-unions.
Slot, however, accepts, perhaps too easily, that the European Communities already can be said to possess a federative character. Nevertheless, it should be questioned whether it would have been possible for
155 Cornelius Kramer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 440.
156 See Van Empel & Slot, supra note 1, at 262-63.
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the Court of Justice to develop a more flexible system of interpretation
given the wording and structure of the Treaty. The wording and the
structure of the Treaty on quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods are not that different from those of Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). If the maintenance
of the system of the GATT were entrusted to a judge, he might come to
conclusions similar to those of the Court of Justice in order to achieve a
consistent system of interpretation of the system of rules.' 5 7 The fact
that the free movement of goods principle is combined with the existence of a Court of Justice, and the fact that citizens have the right to
maintain relevant provisions of the Treaty, necessarily must lead to the
sort of interpretation that the Court of Justice has given. Thus, the
actual existence of the Community Court of Justice, rather than its case
law, causes tension in the current tendency to disintegration. As a
practical matter, the interpretation by the Court of Justice of Article 30
does not differ that much from the rather more restrained formula of
the Commission's Directive 70/50.15 This Directive, to our
knowledge, has not been seriously challenged by any national government, and certainly no Member State has challenged it before the
Court of Justice.
Primarily, the imminent planning deficiency must be compensated
for by giving concrete shape to the coordination of economic policies.
This is consistent with the view advanced by Slot. It must be admitted,
however, that the political realities do not offer much hope of this being
achieved. Certain propositions, nevertheless, may be advanced. First,
national macro-economic policies are hardly, if at all, affected by Articles 30-36. Second, the interpretation of Articles 30-36 in practice,
leaves enough room for compulsory regulatory measures having noneconomic objectives because of the proviso allowing for ultimately
overriding interests. Third, not all compulsory economic regulatory
measures as such are incompatible with Articles 30-36. Examples include price control measures, and controls on establishment and investment. Fourth, modern means of planning such as support grants are
subject to a much more flexible Community system because of the possibility of exemption on economic grounds. Also, purely indicative
planning remains legally wholly unaffected by these Articles. Finally,
and most importantly, the possibility that effective national planning
157 Ajudge would certainly not go nearly as far as the Court of Justice, because of the fact that
GATT is not aimed at a common market. In this connection, see the very interesting recent ruling
of the Court in PolydorLtd v. Harlequin,Case270/80 (unreported), where the notion of measures
with equivalent effect was less strictly interpreted in the Free Trade Treaty with Portugal.
158 Commission Directive 70/50 of Dec. 22, 1969, OJ. Eur. COMM. 17 (Spec. Ed. 1970(1)).
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measures will be taken, ultimately is much more restricted by the fact
that imports and exports depend on the economic development and
policies of other Member States and indeed of third countries, than it is
by the legal restrictions that arise from the Treaty. Even France, with
its initially nationalistic policies, has recognized this last contention in
the formulation (liberalization) of its national economic policies since
the sixties. The possibilities of national planning policies are restricted
to the extent that imports from, and exports to, other countries are free
and, therefore, cannot be planned. Principally, it is the unwillingness
to recognize the truth of this last contention as a pre-condition for national economic policies, that has caused great political tension in
countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
There are no apparent signs of any turnaround in the direction of
the case law of the Court of Justice on Articles 30-36. Indeed, with
respect to some matters it might well be argued that the Court of Justice has gone further than it needs to maintain a consistent judicial policy in the interpretation of the Treaty system. 15 9 It remains unclear
why the Court of Justice in the Vriend case deviated from the flexible
policy it adopted in the French wine cases' 60 and again advanced the
dangerous principle of exclusivity with respect to the Common Agricul162
61
tural Policy it enunciated in Galli' and later seemed to forsake.

159 See notes 96-102 and accompanying text supra.
160 [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1023, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 490.
161 [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 47, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 211.

162 In 1981 the following thirteen new cases on Articles 30-36 were decided by the Court of
Justice: Officier van Justitie v. Kortmann, [1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 251; Officier van Justitie v.
Eyssen, [1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409; Membran GmbH and K-tel Int'l v. GEMA, [1981] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 44; Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco, [1981] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 590; Kelderman, [1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
527; Weigand v. Schutzverband Deutscher Wein, [1981] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 583; United Foods
v. Belgian State, Case 132/80, Apr. 7, 1981 (unreported), [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273; Commis-

sion of the European Communities v. Ireland, Case 113/80, June 17, 1981 (unreported); Merck v.
Stephar and Stephanus, Case 187/80, July 14, 1981 (unreported), [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 463;
Re Sergius Oebel, Case 155/80, July 14, 1981 (unreported); Pfizer, Case 1/81, (transcript) [1982] 1
Comm. Mkt L.R. 406 (Dec. 3, 1981); and Biological Products, Case 272/80, Dec. 17, 1981 (unreported). On the whole, these new decisions and the important preliminary ruling of Mar. 2, 1982
on "passing of" (Beele, 6/81) follow the lines of the case law analyzed in this article. Cases 55/80,
57/80 and Dansk extend the ruling on patent law, however, to copyrights and, in Beele it was
decided that "passing of" does not come under Article 36, but has to be judged along the lines of
Dassonville and Rewe.

